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￿Dealers have got the market sewn up,￿Nelson spat. ￿Bloodsucking bastards
that they are ...￿Resurrection Men (1991) by Ian Rankin
1 Introduction
We study bilateral exchange, both direct trade, and indirect trade that happens through
intermediaries, or middlemen. We develop a model of this activity and present a sequence
of applications. The framework illustrates how, and how many, middlemen get involved.
Although there is much economic research on the topic, in general, a neglected aspect that
seems important to business practitioners is that there are often multiple middlemen engaged
in getting goods from the originator to end user ￿e.g., from farmer to broker to distributor
to retailer to consumer.1 A feature we emphasize is that the terms of trade one might
negotiate with an intermediary depend on upcoming negotiations with the second, third
and other downstream intermediaries. We call this bargaining with bargainers. We also have
something to say about the roles of buyers and sellers ￿ in particular, which are which
￿in bilateral exchange, and about the interpretation of prices. We develop a particular
bargaining solution and discuss how it relates to other solutions. Additionally, we illustrate
how bubbles can emerge in the value of inventories as they get traded across intermediaries.
In terms of related work, it was not so long ago that Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987)
motivated their paper as follows:
Despite the important role played by intermediation in most markets, it is largely
ignored by the standard theoretical literature. This is because a study of inter-
mediation requires a basic model that describes explicitly the trade frictions that
give rise to the function of intermediation. But this is missing from the standard
market models, where the actual process of trading is left unmodeled.
1As a special case of this example, taken from Cooke (2000), consider illegal drugs. As another example,
Ellis (2009) describes the internet like this: ￿If a majority of the wholesale companies being advertised are
not true wholesale companies, then what are they and where are they getting their products? They are
likely just middleman operating within a chain of middleman. A middleman chain occurs when a business
purchases its resale products from one wholesale company, who in turn purchases the products from another
wholesale company, which may also purchase the products from yet another wholesale company, and so on.￿
1Although we think there is more to be done, many subsequent studies have attempted to
rectify the situation by analyzing the roles of middlemen, and how they a⁄ect the quality
of matches, the time required to conduct transactions, the variety of goods on the market,
bid-ask spreads, and other phenomena.
Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987) themselves focus on search frictions, and for them,
middlemen are agents who have an advantage over the original suppliers in the rate at
which they meet buyers. Focusing instead on information frictions, Biglaiser (1993) and Li
(1998,1999) present models where middlemen are agents with expertise that allows them to
distinguish high- from low-quality goods, and show how the presence of informed intermedi-
aries helps to ameliorate lemons problems. In other papers (Camera 2001, Johri and Leach
2002, Shevchenko 2004, Smith 2004, Dong 2009, and Watanabe 2010a,b), middlemen hold
inventories of either more, or more types of, commodities that help buyers obtain their pre-
ferred goods more easily. See also Kalai, Postlewaite and Roberts (1978), Bose and Sengupta
(2010), Tse (2009), and Masters (2007,2008).
In general, middlemen may hold inventories or act as market makers that get buyers and
sellers together (Yavas 1992,1994,1996; Gehrig 1993; Rust and Hall 2003). Models of these
activities in ￿nancial markets include Du¢ e, Garleanu and Pedersen (2005), Miao (2006),
Weill (2007), Lagos and Rocheteau (2009), and Lagos, Rocheteau and Weill (2009). Many
of these applications can be considered part of the New Monetarist economics surveyed by
Nosal and Rocheteau (2010) and Williamson and Wright (2010a,b), de￿ned by an endeavor to
explicitly model the exchange process, and institutions that facilitate this process, like money,
intermediaries, etc., often using search theory. We say more later about the relationship
between intermediation and money; for now, we mention that early search-based models of
monetary exchange like Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) not only make predictions about which
objects might emerge as media of exchange, as a function of their properties and agents￿
beliefs, they also make perhaps less-well-known predictions about which agents emerge as
middlemen.
Search theory is the right tool for analyzing intermediaries, and related institutions,
2for the reason articulated by Rubinstein and Wolinsky: it models exchange explicitly. In
a sense, this study is as much about search theory as it is about the substantive topic of
middlemen. We set up the environment di⁄erently, in several ways, from previous studies.
This is because we are less interested in why middlemen have a role, in the sense that much
of the analysis revolves around environments where trade must be intermediated. Instead,
we focus on equilibrium patterns of trade, with potentially long chains of intermediation,
and the determination of the terms of trade. Still, for comparison, we present a version
that generalizes standard models like Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987). More ambitiously,
we strive to bridge some gaps between disparate branches of search theory by showing how
several ostensibly di⁄erent models can be interpreted in light of our framework. This leads
us to discuss several questions about models of bilateral trade, including, who is the buyer
and who is the seller, and what is the price? In terms of price determination, we focus on a
particular bargaining solution that we think is attractive for equilibrium search theory, but
we also compare results for other more standard bargaining solutions.
A recently popular activity that our model captures is ￿ipping, which according to
Wikipedia involves ￿purchasing a revenue-generating asset and quickly reselling (or ￿ ￿ ip-
ping￿ ) it for pro￿t.￿Although one can ￿ ip any asset, the term is most often applied to real
estate (and sometimes initial public o⁄erings). In particular, as regards our focus on inter-
mediation chains, ￿Under the multiple investor ￿ ip, one investor purchases a property at
below-market value, assigns or sells it quickly to a second investor, who subsequently sells it
to the ￿nal consumer, closer to market value.￿Of course, ￿Pro￿ts from ￿ ipping real estate
come from either buying low and selling high (often in a rapidly-rising market), or buying a
house that needs repair and ￿xing it up before reselling.￿We focus on the former, although
it is easy to extend the model to the case where intermediaries add value. Moreover, as
Wikipedia also emphasizes, it is common to think that this activity may have something to
do with the generation of housing (and other) price bubbles, de￿ned here as equilibria where
the prices of inventories di⁄er from their fundamental value. As we said above, our model is
capable of generating bubble-like equilibria.
3The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out some basic assumptions
and examples. Section 3 presents our extension of standard models. Section 4 goes into
detail concerning the dynamics of exchange and pricing in intermediated markets. Section 5
discusses bigger issues of interpretation in this class of models, including the relation between
distinct branches of the search literature. Section 6 takes up bubbles. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Basic Assumptions
Consider a set of agents A = fA1;A2;:::ANg, where N ￿ 1: They are spatially separated
with the following connections: An can meet, and hence trade, with An￿1 and An+1 but no
one else. We can represent the population as a graph with the set of nodes A connected as
show in Figure 1. There are search frictions, which means it can take time and other resources
for An to meet An+1. There is an indivisible object x in ￿xed supply, and a divisible object
y that anyone can produce at unit cost (i.e., the utility of producing y units of this object
is ￿y). Only A1 is endowed with x, and he can either try to trade it to A2 in exchange
for y1, or consume it himself for utility ￿1. Hence, ￿1 is A1￿ s opportunity cost of trading x,
although for many purposes one can alternatively interpret it as a production cost.
A2 A3 An …… ..
x x x x
y1 y2 yn-1 yn
A1
Figure 1: Population graph
More generally, if any agent An acquires x from An￿1, he can either consume it for payo⁄
￿n, or try to trade it to An+1 for payo⁄ u(yn) = yn. If A1 trades x to A2 and A2 trades
it to A3 ... before some AN eventually consumes it, we say trade is intermediated and call
A2;:::AN￿1 intermediaries or middlemen (in principle An could also try to trade x back to
An￿1 but this never happens). For most of what we do it is assumed that An exits the
4market after trading x to An+1.2
2.2 Example: N = 2
Consider an economy with N = 2 ￿or, equivalently, for this exercise, N = 1 with ￿n > 0
for n ￿ 2 and ￿n = 0 for all n > 2, since this implies x will never be traded beyond A2 (see
below). In this case there can be no middlemen, but it is still useful as a vehicle to illustrate
our trading protocol and as an input into the more interesting cases to follow. We begin by
ignoring search, and asking what happens if A1 happens to meet A2. If ￿2 ￿ ￿1, there are
no gains from trade, and A1 consumes x. If ￿2 > ￿1, they play the following game:
Stage 1: A1 moves by making an o⁄er ￿give me y1 for x.￿
Stage 2: A2 moves by accepting or rejecting, where:
￿ accept means the game ends;
￿ reject means we go to stage 3.
Stage 3: Nature moves (a coin toss) with the property that:
￿ with probability ￿1, A1 makes A2 a take-it-or-leave-it o⁄er;
￿ with probability 1 ￿ ￿1, A2 makes A1 a take-it-or-leave-it o⁄er.
Figure 2 shows the game tree.3 If the initial o⁄er y1 is accepted, A1 gets payo⁄ y1 and
A2 gets ￿2 ￿ y1: If y1 is rejected, with probability ￿1, A1 gets the whole surplus leaving A2
2If one wants to keep the economy going forever, it is simple to replace every An with a ￿clone￿of himself
after he leaves the market (see e.g. Burdett and Coles 1997). As an alternative to ￿cloning￿in Section 3 we
￿recycle￿agents by allowing them to continue rather than exit after trade.
3We are not sure of the original use of this extensive form, but it is obviously related to Stahl (1972),
Rubinstein (1982), Binmore (1987) and McCleod and Malcomson (1993), to name a few. The exact speci￿-
cation, with just two rounds of bargaining where the second has a coin toss to determine who makes the ￿nal
o⁄er, appeared in early versions of Cahuc, Postel-Vinay and Robin (2006), but they ultimately switched to a
more standard game, which gives the same results in their moddel. We say more about this below. For now,
we mention that it is more interesting with nonlinear utility, since with linearity one can actually ignore the
￿rst round and just use a coin toss to determine who makes a take-it-or-leave-it o⁄er (as in several previous
search models, e.g., Gale 1990 or Mortensen and Wright 2002). Since a coin toss induces risk, however, with
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Figure 2: Game tree
with his outside option 0, and with probability 1￿￿1, A1 gets his outside option ￿1 while A2
gets the surplus ￿2 ￿ ￿1. The unique subgame perfect equilibrium is: at stage 1, A1 makes
A2 his reservation o⁄er, which means A2 indi⁄erent between accepting and rejecting, and he
accepts.4 The indi⁄erence condition is ￿2 ￿ y1 = (1 ￿ ￿1)(￿2 ￿ ￿1), or
y1 = (1 ￿ ￿1)￿1 + ￿1￿2: (1)
Payo⁄s are V1 = ￿1 + ￿1(￿2 ￿ ￿1) and V2 = (1 ￿ ￿1)(￿2 ￿ ￿1). Of course, agents are not
compelled to participate, but as long as ￿2 > ￿1 we have V1 ￿ ￿1 and V2 ￿ 0, so the payo⁄s
beat the outside options. Equivalently, de￿ning the total surplus as the sum of payo⁄s minus
outside options, S12 = V1 ￿ ￿1 + V2 = ￿2 ￿ ￿1, the agents trade as long as S12 ￿ 0.
For comparison, consider the standard generalization of Nash (1950) bargaining, where
threat points are given by the outside options:
y1 = argmax
y (y ￿ ￿1)
￿1 (￿2 ￿ y)
1￿￿1 (2)
It is easy to see that this is equivalent to (1). Hence, our game implements the Nash
solution. It also implements Kalai￿ s (1977) proportional bargaining solution, which has
4This is almost but not quite right. If agents are risk neutral there is an equilibrium where the initial
o⁄er is rejected and we move to Stage 2, but it is payo⁄ equivalent. One can re￿ne that away by assuming a
small probability of an exogenous breakdown, or discounting, between rounds. Or, as we do below, one can
assume risk aversion. In either case the outcome in the text is the unique equilibrium.
6become popular in search theory recently (see Lester, Postlewaite and Wright 2010, e.g., for
an application and references), since it is the same as Nash in this example, giving A1 a
fraction ￿1 of S12. We call the probability ￿n the bargaining power of An when he plays with
An+1, and allow it to vary across agents, because we believe it is an important component
of intermediation ￿e.g., one reason that athletes, artists, etc. employ agents may have to
do with comparative advantage in bargaining.5
If it takes time and e⁄ort for An to meet An+1, the value of search is
rV n = ￿n
￿
yn ￿ V n
￿
￿ cn;
where r is the rate of time preference, ￿n a Poisson arrival rate, cn a ￿ ow search cost, and
we distinguish V n, the value of looking for a game, from Vn, the value of playing one. Since
cn is only paid when An has x and is looking for An+1, not when An￿1 is looking for An, we





and An is willing to search for An+1 only if this exceeds his opportunity cost ￿n, or
(r + ￿n)￿n ￿ ￿nyn ￿ cn: (4)
Using (4) and (1), we see that search by A1 is viable i⁄
c1 + (r + ￿1)￿1 ￿ ￿1 [(1 ￿ ￿1)￿1 + ￿1￿2]; (5)
which says the expected payo⁄covers the direct search cost and opportunity cost, appropri-
ately capitalized. Since (5) implies S12 ￿ 0, the binding constraint for trade is the viability
of search, not the outside options. We can let the search frictions vanish either by letting
r ! 0 and c1 ! 0, or letting ￿n ! 1, since all that matters is r=￿n and cn=￿n. When the
search frictions vanish, (5) holds, which means search is viable, i⁄ S12 ￿ 0.
5Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987) use a simple surplus-splitting rule, corresponding to ￿n = 1=2 in our
game when we have linear utility (but see below, where we have nonlinear utility). They say ￿The reason
that we abandon the strategic approach [used in their 1985 paper] here is that it would greatly complicate the
exposition without adding insights.￿Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986) provide a strong argument
in favor of the strategic approach ￿it makes the timing, threat points, etc. less ambiguous ￿and we ￿nd
this clari￿es rather than ￿greatly complicating￿the analysis. Also, whatever approach one takes, it is clearly
desirable to go beyond the symmetric case ￿ = 1=2 (see also Masters 2007,2008).
72.3 Example: N = 3
Now consider N = 3: an originator A1; a potential end user A3; and a potential middleman
A2 (or, equivalently, for this exercise, N = 1 with ￿n = 0 for all n > 3). Note that A3 is
an end user in the sense that if he acquires x he consumes it, since there is no one left to
take it o⁄ his hands, but it is possible that A1 prefers consuming x rather than searching
for A2, or A2 prefers consuming it rather than searching for A3. Di⁄erent from some related
models, here A1 and A3 cannot meet directly (this is relaxed in Section 3). Hence, the only
way to get x from A1 to A3 is via the intermediary A2.6
Given these assumptions, we ask which trades occur, and at what terms. Working back-
wards, if A2 with x meets A3 then, as in the case N = 2, we have
y2 = (1 ￿ ￿2)￿2 + ￿2￿3: (6)
Payo⁄s from this trade are V2 = y2 and V3 = (1 ￿ ￿2)(￿3 ￿ ￿2), and the total surplus is
S23 = ￿3 ￿ ￿2, so they trade as long as ￿3 ￿ ￿2. More stringently, for search by A2 to be
viable we require V 2 ￿ ￿2, or
c2 + (r + ￿2)￿2 ￿ ￿2 [(1 ￿ ￿2)￿2 + ￿2￿3]: (7)
If (7) holds then, upon acquiring x, A2 looks to trade it to A3; if (7) fails then A2 consumes
x himself. In the latter case, A3 is irrelevant, and e⁄ectively we have N = 2.
So, suppose (7) holds, and back up to where A1 meets A2. When A1 makes the initial
o⁄er y1, A2￿ s indi⁄erence condition is ￿y1 +V 2 = (1￿￿1)
￿
V 2 ￿ ￿1
￿
. Inserting V 2, we have









, and S12 ￿ 0 i⁄
c2 ￿ ￿￿1 (r + ￿2) + ￿2 [￿2￿3 + (1 ￿ ￿2)￿2]:
6Thus, we cannot ask here why the market doesn￿ t cut out the middlemen ￿or, in more modern jargon,
why there isn￿ t disintermediation. On that issue, practioners say this: ￿why doesn￿ t every wholesaler just
buy from the manufacture and get the deepest discount? The answer is simple ￿not all wholesalers (or
companies claiming to be wholesalers) can a⁄ord to purchase the minimum bulk-order requirements that a
manufacture requires. Secondly, many manufactures only do business with companies that are established￿
(Ellis 2009). We do not model this explicitly, but it might be worth pursuing in future work.
8More stringently, for search by A1 to be viable we require V 1 ￿ ￿1, or using (6) and (8)
c1 ￿ ￿(r + ￿1)￿1 + ￿1
￿
(1 ￿ ￿1)￿1 + ￿1




Summarizing, after some algebra, for x to pass from A1 to A2 to A3 we require
(r + ￿2)c1 + ￿1￿1c2 ￿ ￿(r + ￿1￿1)(r + ￿2)￿1 + ￿1￿1￿2(1 ￿ ￿2)￿2 + ￿1￿1￿2￿2￿3 (9)
c2 ￿ ￿(r + ￿2￿2)￿2 + ￿2￿2￿3: (10)
If the inequality in (10) is reversed then A2 consumes x if he gets it, and he gets it if
c1 ￿ ￿(r + ￿1￿1)￿1 + ￿1￿1￿2 (11)
since this makes search by A1 viable when A2 consumes x. Note that reversing the inequality
in (11) means A1 will not search for A2 given A2 consumes x, but search by A1 may still be
viable if A2, instead of consuming x, ￿ ips it to A3. As a special case, when search frictions
vanish (r ! 0 and cn ! 0), search by A2 is viable i⁄ ￿3 ￿ ￿2. Given A2 searches, in this
case, search by A1 is viable i⁄ ￿1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿2)￿2 + ￿2￿3. Alternatively, if A2 does not search
because ￿3 < ￿2, then search by A1 is viable i⁄ ￿2 ￿ ￿1.
To develop some more economic intuition, return to the case there are search frictions,
r > 0 and cn > 0, but now suppose ￿2 = 0 so that A2 is a pure middleman, with no desire
to consume x himself. If A2 obtains x he searches for A3 if the expected payo⁄ exceeds the
pure search cost, ￿2￿2￿3 ￿ c2. If this inequality is reversed A2 does not want x, and the
market shuts down. But if ￿2￿2￿3 ￿ c2, so that A2 would search for A3, then A1 searches
for A2 i⁄
(r + ￿2)c1 + ￿1￿1c2 ￿ ￿(r + ￿1￿1)(r + ￿2)￿1 + ￿1￿1￿2￿2￿3:
In words, the RHS is A1￿ s expected share of A2￿ s expected share of the end user￿ s payo⁄, net
of his opportunity cost, while the LHS is A1￿ s direct search cost and the amount he has to
compensate A2 for A2￿ s search costs, all appropriately capitalized.
When ￿2 = 0, and additionally r ! 0 and cn ! 0, A1 searches for A2 who searches for
A3 i⁄ ￿2￿3 ￿ ￿1. The salient point is that ￿3 > ￿1 is not enough to get x from A1 to A3,
9even when ￿2, r and cn are negligible. This is a typical holdup problem. Potential middleman
A2 knows that A3 is willing to give anything up to ￿3 to get x, and A1 would be willing to
let it go for as little as ￿1, which sounds like there is a deal to be done. But when A2 meets
A3 he only gets y2 = ￿2￿3. He may protest he needs more just to cover his cost, in this
case y1 = (1 ￿ ￿1)￿1 +￿1￿2￿3. Being educated in economics, however, A3 would (implicitly)
counter that this cost is sunk and irrelevant for the negotiations. And he would be right.
Hence A2 will not intermediate a deal unless y2 ￿ y1, or ￿2￿3 ￿ ￿1 in this case. This market
failure is due to lack of commitment. If A3 and A2 could sign a binding ex ante contract,
the former could commit to paying the latter at least enough to cover his cost, but such
commitment is proscribed here ￿as in many search models, it seems reasonable to assume
you cannot contract with someone before you contact someone.
Without the assumptions r ! 0, cn ! 0 and ￿2 = 0, the results are similar, but richer ￿
e.g., there is an additional aspect of holdup as the cost c2 is also sunk when A2 meets A3.
Note the asymmetry: A3 does not compensate A2 for his search cost, but A1 does compensate
A2 for his, because only in the former negotiations is the costs sunk; similarly, A1 shares in
the upstream value ￿3 but A3 does not share in the downstream cost y1. A general conclusion
to draw from this is that whether trade even gets o⁄the ground, as well as the terms of trade
and payo⁄s when it does, depend on not only fundamentals and bargaining power in any
bilateral trading opportunity, but also on these parameters in downstream opportunities. In
particular, gains from trade between A1 and A2 depend on A2￿ s bargaining power when he
later meets A3. This is what we call bargaining with bargainers.7
3 Competing Risks
Here we present a formulation where, as in many of the models discussed in the Introduction,
there are large numbers of agents of each type, and any agent can meet any other. Following
most of the literature, there are N = 3 types: originators A1, potential middlemen A2, and
7To close this section, note that our game again implements the generalized Nash or proportional bar-
gaining outcome, where the surplus for An is y ￿ ￿n, and the surplus for An+1 it is V n+1 ￿ y if he searches
and ￿n+1 ￿ y otherwise.
10potential end users A3, with ￿1 = ￿2 = 0 < ￿3. As in competing risk models in duration
analysis, from whence we take the name, there is e.g. a risk of A1 meeting either A2 or A3.
Also, agents here continue in, rather than exit from, the market after trade.
With more types of meetings we need more notation. Let ￿n 2 f0;1g indicate whether
An searches, n = 1;2; let ￿ 2 f0;1g = 1 indicate whether A1 trades with A2; and let m be
the steady state probability that A2 is in possession of x. To keep track of A2￿ s inventory,
write V 2i where i 2 f0;1g. Also, let ￿nn0 be the rate at which An meets An0, and ynn0 the
equilibrium outcome in their bargaining game. The value functions satisfy:8
rV 1 = ￿12(1 ￿ m)￿y12 + ￿13y13 ￿ c1 (12)
rV 3 = ￿1￿31(￿3 ￿ y13) + ￿2￿32m(￿3 ￿ y23) (13)
rV 20 = ￿1￿21￿(V 21 ￿ V 20 ￿ y12) (14)
rV 21 = ￿23(y23 + V 20 ￿ V 21) ￿ c2 (15)
The indi⁄erence conditions in bargaining are:
￿3 ￿ y13 = (1 ￿ ￿13)￿3 (16)
￿3 ￿ y23 = (1 ￿ ￿23)
￿
￿3 + V 20 ￿ V 21
￿
(17)
V 21 ￿ V 20 ￿ y12 = (1 ￿ ￿12)
￿
V 21 ￿ V 20
￿
(18)
Let the population be given by (￿1;￿2;￿3), where ￿n is the measure of type An agents,
with ￿1 + ￿2 + ￿3 = 1. Since the number of meetings between n and n0 must be the same
as the number of meetings between n0 and n, we have three identities: ￿1￿12 = ￿2￿21,
￿2￿23 = ￿3￿32, and ￿3￿31 = ￿1￿13. The steady state value of m is given by the equating the





8These equations give the value of searching, but since An has the option of not searching, for n = 1;2,




. Also, due to ￿recycling￿there is no capital gain term
when A1 or A3 trade ￿e.g., the surplus for A1 from trading with A2 is y12 plus continuation value V 1, minus
the outside option V 1, which nets to y12.
11A steady state equilibrium is described by the trade decision ￿ between A1 and A3 and search
decisions ￿1 and ￿2 satisfying conditions discussed below, along with terms of trade, value
functions and inventory distribution solving (12)-(19).
Depending on parameters, di⁄erent types of equilibria can arise. In type 0 equilibrium,
A1 does not search and the market shuts down; in type 1 equilibrium, A1 searches and trades
x to A3 but not A2, so that middleman are inactive; and in type 2 equilibrium, A1 searches
and trades x to A3 or A2, and A2 searches for A3, so there is intermediated trade. These
are the only possible outcomes.9 However, even if A1 does not search (i.e., ￿1 = 0), we must
specify as part of the equilibrium whether A1 and A2 would trade, if they were to meet, o⁄
the equilibrium path (subgame perfection). To construct the equilibrium set, ergo, we must
check the following. First are the search decisions: ￿1 = 1 if V 1 > 0 and ￿1 = 0 if V 1 < 0;
￿2 = 1 if V 21 > V 20 and ￿2 = 0 if V 21 < V 20. Then there is the condition that determines
whether A1 and A2 trade: ￿ = 1 if S12 > 0 and ￿ = 0 if S12 < 0, where S12 = V 21 ￿ V 20.
Note ￿2 = 1 i⁄ ￿ = 1. Hence, in what follows, we focus on trading decisions.
Here we emphasize the economics, relegating algebra to Appendix A. We begin with type
0 equilibrium, where A1 does not search. There are two versions of this equilibrium: one
where A1 and A2 would trade if were to meet; one where they would not. For the latter, to
guarantee ￿ = 0 we need ￿23￿23￿3 ￿ c2, and to guarantee ￿1 = 0 we need ￿13￿13￿3 ￿ c1,
shown in the upper right of Figure 3. For the former, where A1 does not search but if would
trade with A2 were they to meet, we need ￿23￿23￿3 ￿ c2 to guarantee ￿ = 1 and
0 ￿ (￿2￿23 + ￿1￿12)[￿2r + ￿2￿23￿23 + ￿1￿12(1 ￿ ￿12)](￿13￿13￿3 ￿ c1) (20)
+￿12￿23￿
2
2￿12 (￿23￿23￿3 ￿ c2)
to guarantee ￿1 = 0, also shown in Figure 3. When transactions costs are above certain
thresholds, trade shuts down, which is no surprise; the point of the analysis is to determine
exactly how the thresholds depend on the search and bargaining parameters, given by the
￿￿ s and ￿￿ s, as well as the fundamental value of x, given by ￿3.
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Figure 3: Equilibria in competing risk model
In terms of equilibria where the market does not shut down, type 1 equilibrium with
￿1 = 1 and ￿ = 0 exists i⁄ ￿13￿13￿3 ￿ c1 and ￿23￿23￿3 ￿ c2, also shown in Figure 3. In
this equilibrium A1 searches but does not trade with A2, either because A2 has high search
costs (c2=￿3 is big), meets A3 infrequently (￿23 is small), or bargains poorly (￿23 is low). By
contrast, in type 2 equilibrium, where ￿1 = 1 and ￿ = 1, middlemen do play a role. This
equilibrium exists i⁄ ￿23￿23￿3 ￿ c2 and
0 ￿ (￿2￿23 + ￿1￿12)[￿2r + ￿2￿23￿23 + ￿1￿12(1 ￿ ￿12)](￿13￿13￿3 ￿ c1) (21)
+￿12￿23￿
2
2￿12 (￿23￿23￿3 ￿ c2);
again shown in Figure 3. The diagonal line represents how A1￿ s search decision depends on
c2, because y12 depends on A2￿ s expected cost and bene￿t from search.
In type 2 equilibrium, with active middlemen, one can check their pro￿t margin is
y23 ￿ y12 / ￿23 (￿3r + c2) + (1 ￿ ￿12)[￿23￿3 (￿23 + ￿21) ￿ c2] > 0: (22)
This is increasing in ￿23, the rate at which A2 trades with A3.10 Note that in the limit as
10This follows from calculating
y23 =
[r + ￿23 + ￿1￿21￿(1 ￿ ￿12)]￿23￿3 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿23)c2
r + ￿23￿23 + ￿1￿21￿(1 ￿ ￿12)
and y12 =
￿12(￿23￿23￿3 ￿ c2)
r + ￿23￿23 + ￿1￿21￿(1 ￿ ￿12)
;
and noting that the second term on the LHS of (22) is positive by the equilibrium condition for ￿ = 1.
Unlike Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987), we cannot show y23 > y13 > y12, in general, although we can in the
symmetric case ￿nn0 = 1=2.
13r ! 0 the market shuts down. The reason is that when either A1 or A2 trade with A3, if
r ￿ 0 they only get their outside option, which is not enough for search to be viable in the
￿rst place ￿again, a holdup problem. In Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987), by contrast, the
pro￿t margin vanishes as r ! 0, but the market still operates.
Intuitively, for intermediaries to have an active role A2 must have a comparative advan-
tage over A1 in terms of costs, arrival rates or bargaining power (generalizing the standard
model that considers only di⁄erences in arrival rates). The most interesting case is when
(c1;c2) is below the diagonal line in Figure 3, where we have equilibrium with active inter-
mediaries, while if intermediation were not available, or most costly, the market would shut
down completely. Note, however, that these substantive results are not very di⁄erent from
what we ￿nd in our baseline model, where An can only trade x to An+1. Indeed, a diagram
similar to Fig 3 can be drawn for that model, partitioning (c1;c2) space into four regions
with similar economic properties ￿the main di⁄erence being that, in the baseline model,
when A2 does not search it means he consumes x, while in this version it means he disposes
of it, and hence he never accepts it in the ￿rst place. In any case, having solved this model,
we now return to the baseline speci￿cation to investigate longer intermediation chains.
4 Multiple Middlemen












Solving for yn, we have
yn = (1 ￿ ￿n)￿n + ￿n
￿n+1yn+1 ￿ cn+1
r + ￿n+1
￿ ￿n (yn+1): (24)
We interpret yn = ￿n (yn+1) as something like a best response condition for An: it gives yn, his
initial o⁄er strategy when he meets An+1, as a function of others￿strategies, as summarized
by yn+1, since that is all he needs to know to choose yn.
14Conditional on An having acquired x, it is easy to see that An and An+1 end up trading
in equilibrium i⁄:
1. V n =
￿nyn ￿ cn
r + ￿n
￿ ￿n, so An wants to search;
2. Vn;n+1 = yn ￿ ￿n, so An wants to trade;
3. Vn+1;n = ￿yn + V n+1 ￿ 0, so An+1 wants to trade.
The second condition is not binding given the ￿rst, while the third reduces to11
yn+1 ￿
￿n(r + ￿n+1) + cn+1
￿n+1
: (25)
Now, to investigate how long intermediation chains can be, consider a quasi-stationary envi-
ronment, where ￿n, cn and ￿n are the same for all n, while ￿n = ￿ for n ￿ N, ￿N+1 = ^ ￿ > ￿,
and ￿n = 0 for n > N + 1. We call AN+1 the end user because, if he gets x, he consumes it,
since An does not value x for n > N + 1.12
Now (24) can be written yn = ￿(yn+1) for n < N, where ￿(y) = (1￿￿)￿+￿(￿y ￿ c)=(r + ￿),
while yN = (1 ￿ ￿)￿ + ￿^ ￿. Clearly, ￿(y) has a unique ￿xed point,
y
￿ =
(1 ￿ ￿)￿ (r + ￿) ￿ ￿c
r + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
;
where we assume c < (1 ￿ ￿)￿ (r + ￿)=￿ so y￿ > 0. It is easy to see yN > ￿ > y￿ > ￿(0),
as in Figure 4. The way to read in Figure 4 is: given An+1 correctly anticipates getting yn+1
from An+2, in bargaining with An the equilibrium outcome is yn. Now, to ￿nd equilibrium,
begin by working backwards: set yN = (1￿￿)￿+￿^ ￿ and iterate on yn = ￿(yn+1) to construct
a sequence fyng, where it is obvious that yn ! y￿ as n ! ￿1. Then, since we are actually
interested in what happens as n increases, moving forward in real time, pick a point in this
sequence and iterate forward. This generates a candidate equilibrium.
The sequence fyng is only a candidate equilibrium because we still have to check if search
is viable for all agents in the chain. Clearly we cannot have arbitrarily long chains, since,
11By inserting yn+1 = ￿￿1
n (yn), one can see (25) holds i⁄ yn ￿ ￿n.
12As above, we are asserting here that x cannot go from AN+1 to AN+2 when An = 0 for all n > N + 1.














Figure 4: Path of yn
going backwards in time, this would involve starting arbitrarily close to y￿ < ￿, and if
yn < ￿ the holder of x would rather consume it than search. Consider e.g. starting with
AN￿2 holding x. Suppose AN￿2 searches and trades x to AN￿1, who then searches and trades
with AN, who ￿nally searches and trades x to the end user AN+1. To see if this is viable,





If c is not too big, we can support trade with two middlemen between the originator and
end user. For any c > 0 we cannot support trade with an arbitrary number of middlemen,
however, since yN￿j ! y￿ < ￿, so there is a maximum viable chain. However, if ￿ = c = 0,
then y￿ = 0 and there are arbitrarily long chains starting near 0 and ending at yN. Even
this simple model generates some interesting predictions. To further illustrate, let Tn be the
random date when An trades x to An+1. We focus now on two properties of the trading
process, one from economics and one from statistics.
First, as is obvious from Figure 4, we point out that 4y increases over time: yN ￿yN￿j >
yN￿j￿yN￿j￿1. Thus, as x gets closer to the end user, not only y but the increments in y rise.
Second, since the underlying arrival rates are Poisson, as is well known, the interarrival times
16y
time
Figure 5: Typical realized path for y
Tn ￿ Tn￿1 are distributed exponentially. This entails a high probability of short, and a low
probability of long, interarrival times. Hence, typical realizations of the process have trades
clsutered, with many exchanges occurring in short intervals separated by long intervals of
inactivity. This gives the appearance of market frenzies interspersed by lulls, although (since
Poisson arrivals are memoryless) there are no frenzies or lulls in any meaningful economic
sense.13 Figure 5 illustrates these two features: the statistical property that intervals of
rapid activity are interspersed by long lulls; and the economic property that y grows at an
increasing rate as it approaches the end user, and the ultimate value yN = (1 ￿ ￿)￿ + ￿^ ￿.
5 Discussion
Since the Introduction, we have refrained from using the words buyer, seller and price. This
is intentional, as we want to raise some issues associated with such usage. First, we contend
that in the analog to our model found in much of the search literature, in our notation, x
represents a good and y money, and with this interpretation y is the price, the agent who
trades x for y is a seller, and the one who trades y for x is a buyer. Noteworthy papers that
13This is explained in any good text on stochastic processes. As ˙inlar (1975,79-80) puts it: ￿the interar-
rival times T1;T2 ￿ T1;T3 ￿ T2;::: are independent and identically distributed random variables, with the ...
exponential distribution ... Note that this density is monotone decreasing. As a result, an interarrival time
is more likely to have a length in [0;s] than in a length in [t;t+s] for any t: Thus, a Poisson process has more
short intervals than long ones. Therefore, a plot of the time series of arrivals on a line looks, to the naive eye,
as if the arrivals occur in clusters.￿However, the memoryless property actually implies that ￿knowing that
an interarrival time has already lasted t units does not alter the probability of its lasting another s units.￿
17we interpret in this way include, in addition those on middlemen discussed earlier, Diamond
(1971,1987), Butters (1977), Burdett-Judd (1983) and Rubinstein-Wolinsky (1985), all of
which have an indivisible object corresponding to x called a consumption good (or in some
applications a production good like labor), and a divisible object y interpreted as the price
(or wage). Of course, although they may think of y as dollars, and very often say so explicitly,
these models do not literally have money ￿what they have is transferrable utility.14
Identifying money with (more accurately, confusing money with) transferrable utility is
standard fare by even the best economic theorists. Consider Binmore (1992): ￿Sometimes it
is assumed that contracts can be written that specify that some utils are to be transferred
from one player to another ... Alert readers will be suspicious about such transfers ...
Utils are not real objects and so cannot really be transferred; only physical commodities
can actually be exchanged. Transferable utility therefore only makes proper sense in special
cases. The leading case is that in which both players are risk-neutral and their von Neumann
and Morgenstern utility scales have been chosen so that their utility from a sum of money x
is simply U(x) = x. Transferring one util from one player to another is then just the same
as transferring one dollar.￿Unfortunately, it ain￿ t necessarily so ￿and this is about more
than an abhorrence for the dubious, if evidently not discredited, practice of putting money
in the utility function.
14Submitted in evidence, from middlemen papers, consider the following. Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987,
p.582) describe payo⁄s as the ￿consumption values (in monetary terms) of a unit.￿Biglaiser (1993, p.213)
starts with ￿Each buyer is endowed with money.￿Yavas (1994) describes a standard model of middleman by
￿The sellers and the middlemen value the good (in monetary terms) at zero, while the buyers value the good
at one.￿Yavas (1992) is more careful, saying ￿In order to avoid the additional questions associated with
having money in the economy, this endowment has not been labeled as money.￿Johri and Leach (2002) are
also careful to say ￿units of a divisible numeraire good are exchanged for units of an indivisible heterogeneous
good,￿although they have no problem assuming payo⁄s are linear in the former. Even those less cavalier
about money are quick to decide who is the buyer and seller, and what is the price.
Considering search models outside the middleman literature, Butters (1977, p.466) says ￿A single homo-
geneous good is being traded for money.￿Burdett and Judd (1983, pp.955,960) say consumers search ￿to
lower the expected costs of acquiring, a desired commodity, balancing the monetary cost of search against its
monetary bene￿t,￿and ￿rms want to ￿make more money.￿Diamond (1971,1987) does not mention money
explicitly, although he does refer, in our notation, to y as the price, and buyers are those with payo⁄ ￿ ￿ y
while sellers are those with payo⁄ y, in our notation. In many places in their book, Osborne and Rubinstein
(1990) decribe models as ￿A single indivisible good is traded for some quantity of a divisible good (￿ money￿ ).￿
Gale (1987, p.20) more accurately says ￿A single, indivisible commodity is traded. Buyers and sellers have
transferable utility.￿One can go on, but we think this makes the point that, with exceptions, most papers
suggest that we interpret x as a good, y as a price in money, An as the seller and An+1 as the buyer.
18In serious monetary theory, it is not trivial to transfer dollars across agents, because they
tend to run out ￿no one has an unlimited supply of cash, and for almost all in￿ ation rates
(except the Friedman rule) agents carry less than the amount required for unconstrained
trade. And, in any case, payo⁄s are usually not linear in dollars (with some exceptions, e.g.,
Lagos and Wright 2005). Examples of search-based monetary theory that looks more like
the setup in this paper include the models discussed in Shi (1995), Trejos-Wright (1995),
Kocherlakota (1998), Wallace (2001) and many other papers. The point we emphasize is
that all those models take a diametric position to the above-mentioned applications outside
of monetary economics: they assume y is a consumption good and x is money. The most
apparent di⁄erence is that, under one interpretation, money is divisible and consumption
goods are indivisible, while under the other, money is indivisible and goods indivisible.
Super￿cially this favors the ￿rst interpretation, where y is money, since divisibility is one of
the properties (along with storability, portability and recognizability) commonly associated
with money. On re￿ ection, however, we do think this detail should be given much weight.15
A better discriminating criterion stems from the functional de￿nitions of money: it is a
unit of account, a store of value, and a medium of exchange. The unit of account function
￿which means that American prices tend to be quoted in dollars, and European prices in
euros ￿seems relatively uninteresting, because for anything of consequence it cannot matter
whether we measure prices in dollars or euros any more than whether we measure distance
in feet or meters. Moving to the store of value function, it seems clear that in our baseline
search model it is actually x and not y that constitutes a store of value: x is a durable good
that, when acquired by An at some date, enables him to enjoy a payo⁄ yn at some future
date. The more natural interpretation of y is that it is a perishable good, or a service rather
than a good, that is not carried across time but produced for immediate consumption. It
seems hard to imagine a perishable good or service serving as money. By contrast x, which
is kept in inventory, is obviously a storable asset.
15One reason is that earlier contributions to the search-based monetary literature actually have both x
and y indivisible, while more recent ones have them both divisible (see the surveys cited in the Introduction).
Another is that, as a matter of historical fact, objects used as money including coins were often less-than-
perfectly divisible, with signi￿cant economic consequences (e.g., Sargent and Velde 2000).
19Moreover, x satis￿es the standard de￿nition of a medium of exchange: an object that
is accepted in trade not to be consumed or used in production by all who that accepts it,
but instead to be traded again later. Now, in the above model x happens to be commodity
money, since an end user ultimately does consume it for a direct payo⁄, as opposed to ￿at
money which does not generate a direct payo⁄ for anyone. We have more to say about this
below; for now, we emphasize that y is not a medium of exchange in the above speci￿cation:
it is accepted by everyone for its direct payo⁄, and never to be traded again later. Moreover,
it is exactly the classic double-coincidence problem that makes x useful here: when An wants
y from An+1, he has nothing to o⁄er in trade absent asset x. Indeed, x can facilitate this
exchange even if An+1 does not especially enjoy x, as in the case of ￿n+1 = 0, or, for that
matter, ￿n+1 < 0, since An+1 is only going to trade it again. Based on all this, in terms of
calling either x or y money, maybe the monetary search theorists got this one right.16
Does it matter? While at some level one might say the issue is purely semantic, as if
that were reason not to be interested, we think it actually may matter for how one uses the
theory. For instance, it determines who we call the buyer or seller and what we mean by
the price. To make this point, we ￿rst argue that in nonmonetary exchange ￿say, when A
gives B apples for bananas ￿it is not meaningful to call either agent a buyer or seller. Of
course, one can them whatever one likes, but then the labels buyer and seller convey nothing
more than calling them A and B. However, when A gives B apples for genuine money, for
dollars or euros, everyone should agree that A is the seller and B the buyer (it is perhaps
less clear what to call them when A gives B euros for dollars, but that is beside the point).
We identify agents who pay money as buyers and ones who receive money as sellers, and
claim this corresponds to standard usage.17
16One can also argue x plays much the same role that money plays in non-search monetary models, such
as overlapping-generations models (Wallace 1980). Fleshing this out might be interesting.
17As evidence, consider the following de￿nitions of the verbs buy and sell: ￿acquisition of an article, and
legal assumption of its ownership, in exchange for money or value￿and ￿to transfer ownership of a property
in exchange for money or value￿(businessdictionary.com); ￿to aquire possession, ownership, or rights to the
use or services of by payment especially of money￿and ￿to give up (propery) for something of value (as
money)￿(Meriam Webster); ￿to acquire the possession of, or the right to, by paying or promising to pay
an equivalent, esp. in money￿and ￿to transfer (goods) to or render (services) for another in exchange for
money￿(Dictionary.com); or ￿to get something by paying money for it￿and ￿to give something to someone
else in return for money￿(Cambridge Dictionaries Online).
20Again, one can label objects anything one likes, and be on ￿rm ground logically, if not
aesthetically. But would anyone want to reverse the labels in, say, the Mortensen-Pissarides
(1994) labor-market model, taking the agents we usually think of as workers and calling them
￿rms, and vice versa? One could prove the same theorems, but it would make a di⁄erence
when considering applied questions (e.g., should we tax/subsidize search by workers or by
￿rms?). Using the interpretation in the previous middlemen literature, where y is money
and x is a good, when An and An+1 trade the former is the seller and the latter is the
buyer. Using the interpretation in the monetary literature mentioned above, where x is
money and y is a good, An is the buyer and An+1 is the seller. If one agrees that it makes
a substantive di⁄erence who we call workers and ￿rms in the labor market, it can similarly
make a di⁄erence who we call buyers and sellers in goods markets (e.g., for substantive
questions, like should we tax/subsidize shoppers or retailers?).
Moreover, the two interpretations give opposite predictions for price behavior. If we
normalize the size of the indivisible x to 1, without loss of generality, under the interpretation
that y is money and x is a good, the price is obviously y. But if y is the good and x is money
then 1=y is the price, since now a normalized unit of money buys y units of the good. To
see how this matters, look back at Figure 5. Using the ￿rst interpretation, theory predicts
prices are rising over time, as more and more money y is required to buy the same amount
of consumption good x as it moves closer to the end user. Using the second interpretation,
prices are falling, as over time more and more consumption y can be had for the same amount
of money x. For empirical work, at least, one has to make a choice. We do not intend to
ordain one impeccable or irreproachable interpretation, since this may well depend on the
issues at hand. We do think it is relevant to broach the issue.
We also ￿nd it intriguing that, from a legal standpoint, it often makes a vital di⁄erence
who we construe as buyer and seller. It is not uncommon to have laws or conventions that
allow buyers to return goods and demand a refund, or at least store credit, within a certain
period of time, with no questions asked ￿the principle of caveat emptor notwithstanding.18
18￿The two basic types of warranties are express warranties and implied warranties. An express warranty
is any representation or a¢ rmation about the goods made by the seller￿ s words or conduct. ... Implied
21It is harder to imagine similar laws or conventions applying to sellers. With rare exceptions,
such as bad checks or counterfeit currency, accepting monetary payment entails ￿nality ￿
suggesting a more rigorous principle of caveat venditor. Also, in law, ￿There is a ￿ bias￿in
favour of buyers. Buyers are not obligated to disclose what they know about the value of a
seller￿ s property, but sellers are under a quali￿ed obligation to disclose material facts about
their own property.￿(Ramsay 2006). Beyond legal systems narrowly construed, is also true
that private trading platforms, like ebay, have rules and regulations that treat buyers and
sellers di⁄erently (Beal 2009).
We also cannot help but comment on the asymmetric treatment of buyers and sellers
in illegal markets. It is commonly understood that with drugs and prostitution, the one
who receives the money is usually treated much more harshly than the one who pays (which
raises a question about trading drugs directly for sex, but like trading dollars for euros,
this is beside the point). Indeed, with drugs, it is so much more common to target sellers
than buyers that targeting the latter is referred to as a ￿reverse sting￿operation. With
prostitution, historically buyers have almost always been treated much more leniently than
sellers.19 Similarly, where gambling and drinking are illegal, sellers are typically deemed the
bigger villains. The same can be said for the markets for illegal guns, ￿reworks and so on.
Although we are less sure about this case, it may also be true for stolen merchandise ￿and
note that a fence is not much di⁄erent from a middleman in our model. Intermediaries in
general are often considered less than honorable, if not outright heinous, since they do not
themselves produce anything but simply pro￿t from others, as evidenced by our epigraph
referring to ￿bloodsucking bastards￿and by other timeless condemnations of moneylenders
warranties are warranties that are imposed on sellers by law. A warranty of merchantability is implied
in every sales contract. This warranty is a promise that the goods pass without objection in the trade,
are adequately packaged, conform to all promises or a¢ rmations of fact on the container, and are ￿t for
the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used. The implied warranty of merchantability also in-
cludes a promise that multiple goods will be of even kind and quality.￿From ￿Sales Law - Warranties￿at
http://law.jrank.org/pages/9989/Sales-Law-Warranties.html.
19See the ￿The Staight Dope￿ at http://www.straightdope.com/columns/read/2774/prostitution. Of
course, some argue that this is merely another manifestation of male dominance: ￿As long as society re-
mains male dominated, women selling sex will be in a more vulnerable position than men buying sex.￿See
￿The swedish approach to prostitution￿at http://www.sos-sexisme.org/English/swedish.htm. This suggest
an obvious empirical test by looking at male prostitutes ￿if one were willing to swallow some rather dubious
ceterus paribus assumptions.
22and the like. This is, of course, mainly out of ignorance of the idea that getting goods from
A to B is a productive activity.
In any case, for what it￿ s worth, we ￿nd it is the norm to deem sellers ￿those who
receive money in exchange for goods ￿worse in legal and moral senses than buyers ￿those
who receive goods in exchange for money. Of course, there are exceptions, say in the case
of in child prostitution, but this can be explained by saying that the distinction between
adults and minors takes precedence over the distinction between buyers and sellers without
denying the existence of the latter. Another exception might be when a student ￿or, perish
the thought, a professor ￿gives someone money to write a paper for them.20
Returning to theory, let us reconsider Figure 1. The traditional middleman approach
interprets x as a consumption good being passed from originator to end user along a chain
of intermediaries. At each link in the chain x trades for yn units of money ￿or, better, for yn
transferable utils ￿or, better still, for some amount of a di⁄erent consumption good that is
produced at cost yn by An+1 and consumed for utility yn by An. We have no problem with
linear utility, our quibble is more about agents getting direct utility from money, or if it is
interpreted as indirect utility, it is mostly about cavalierly asserting that the value function
is linear in dollars. These issues aside, we think our framework provides a useful model of
intermediation chains, where one good x trades for another good y, or even a sequence of
di⁄erent goods fyng, since it is easy to imagine An altering or improving x in some way
before he ￿ ips it to An+1. But it is also a coherent model of agents trading an asset x in
exchange for goods produced at cost yn by An+1 and consumed for utility yn by An.
20Our objective here is mainly to point out some asymmetries between buyers and sellers, and not to
explain them. However, one rationale for focusing enforcement e⁄orts on drug and gun dealers, rather than
buyers, is that there are barriers to entry at least at the high end, so that it will be di¢ cult for newcomers to
replace those who are incarcerated (Koper and Reuter 1995). However, the reverse argument can be made
at the lower end, where one dealer removed from a streetcorner is very quickly replaced by another. Other
arguments one hears include the view that those who pro￿t most from illegal activity should be at highest
risk of being punished, as should those that serve as role models for entrants due to their ￿nancial success.
Another is the principle that we tend to judge ethically actions that put others at risk more harshly than
actions by people that put themselves at risk, but while this might ring true for drugs it seems di¢ cult to
make the case for prostitution. The same might be said for the position that if B is weak and A exploits
that weakness, A should be judged more harshly. There is also the idea that for many markets, legal or
illegal, sellers have a lot more transactions than buyers, making it more cost e⁄ective to go after the former.
We must leave these interesting issues for future study.
23Also notice that if we use modulo N arithmetic, this chain becomes a circle, where A1
consumes the output of A2 who consumes the output ... of AN who consumes the output
of A1. This looks much like the environment used to study money in Kiyotaki and Wright
(1989), or at least the generalization in Aiyagari and Wallace (1991). Given that, one
wonders, can the model could support equilibria where x is never consumed, or where it has
zero consumption value?
6 Bubbles
We now consider the notion of bubbles.21 In the analysis so far, we could get chains of trade,
and with cn small these chains can be quite long, but equilibrium is tied down by the fact
that there is a determinate end user who consumes x. Now consider the possibility that
no one consumes x ￿it gets traded forever. The indi⁄erence condition and best response
for yn to yn+1 are again given by (23) and (24). As in the analysis of the quasi-stationary
environment, we assume here that ￿n = ￿, cn = c and ￿n = ￿ for all n; but now we also
assume ￿n = ￿ for all n: In this stationary environment, the best response function becomes




as shown in Figure 6. The viability condition for An to search is ￿ ￿ (￿yn+1 ￿ c)=(r + ￿).
Compared to the quasi-stationary model with a manifest end user AN+1, we no longer have
a terminal condition yn = ￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)^ ￿.
Since yn = ￿(yn+1) implies @yn+1=@yn = (r + ￿)=￿￿, it is clear that there is only one
solution to the di⁄erence equation that remains nonnegative and bounded: yn = y￿ for all
n. Any path that starts at y > y￿ looks like a bubble: agent An is willing to search for
An+1 because he correctly expects a high yn, An+1 is willing to give a high yn because
he expects an even higher yn+1, and so on. But clearly such explosive bubbles are not
consistent with equilibria as long as we make the standard assumption that there is some
upper bound y (e.g., y could be the total output of known universe). One cannot rationally
21We will de￿ne what we mean by a bubble very soon. The literature on this topic is too big to go into;
recent papers by Farhi and Tirole (2010) and Rocheteau and Wright (2010) give extensive references.
24believe that yn will grow beyond ￿ y, and hence this bubble-like path for yn cannot be an
equilibrium. The only equilibrium is, therefore, yn = y￿ for all n, and since ￿ > y￿, we have
V n = (￿y￿ ￿ c)=(r + ￿) < ￿. Search is not viable, which seems natural, since there are no
gains to trade let alone gains to search when all agents get a common payo⁄ from x.
If An tried to trade x to An+1, o⁄ the equilibrium path, he could get exactly yn = ￿ for
it (he couldn￿ t get more and he wouldn￿ t take less). We call yn = ￿ the fundamental value
of x since this is exactly what it is worth in terms of intrinsic properties. Sometimes people
say that whenever yn 6= ￿ there is a bubble, although that does not seem right when agents
are bargaining and generally share the surplus. Hence we say there is a bubble when the
surplus exceeds
Using the traditional middleman interpretation of yn as the price, yn > y￿ means the
bubble price is above the fundamental value of x; using the monetary economics interpreta-
tion of x as money and 1=yn as the price, the same inequality means the price is below the
fundamental value. What we have shown is that, for this speci￿cation, as in most models,
bubbles are not possible.22 In the quasi-stationary environment analyzed above, paths like
the one shown in Figure 5 may resemble bubbles ￿i.e., yn increases by larger and large
increments with each trade ￿but we do not think of it as a particularly remarkable case,
since fyng is clearly pinned down by fundamentals. We are after bigger game.
To this end, consider making the utility of y more general, say U(y), with U(0) = 0,
U0 > 0 and U" < 0. We can keep the cost of producing y equal to y without loss of
generality (by a choice of units). Let y￿ = U￿1(￿) be the cost of covering An￿ s outside
option ￿. Then the bargaining indi⁄erence condition is
￿n+1U(yn+1) ￿ cn+1
r + ￿n+1







which gives the best response condition




22This is the no-bubble result that con￿rms our ealier assertions that if AN+1 gets x he will consume it
in the quasi-stationary model. Also, note that in many models we cannot have prices below fundamental
















Figure 6: Best response in stationary environment
In a stationary environment,




Figure 7 shows a case where y￿ > y￿, or equivalently, U(y￿) > ￿, which we could not get
in the linear case U(y) = y. Since U(y￿) > ￿ is necessary, but not su¢ cient, for satisfying the
search viability condition ￿ ￿ [rU(y￿) ￿ c]=(r+￿), we now at least have a chance, which we
did not have with U(y) = y. We will show below that the search viability condition holds as
long as ￿ is not too big. Also, as drawn, the Figure shows the existence of a unique positive
solution to y￿ = ￿(y￿), which is true i⁄0 < ￿(0) = (1￿￿)y￿ ￿￿c=(r + ￿). Given ￿ > 0, this
obviously holds if c or ￿ is small, or if ￿ is big.
Consider an example with U(y) =
p
y, which means y￿ = ￿2. Setting c = 0, for now, for
simplicity, we have
























(1-θ) yγ - θc/(r+ α)
yγ
Figure 7: Best response with nonlinear U(y)
































+ 4(1 ￿ ￿)￿2:
Squaring and simplifying, this reduces to
￿ ￿
￿￿2
r2 + 2r￿ + ￿￿2 ￿ ￿ ￿: (27)
Since ￿ ￿ > 0, search is viable for some ￿ > 0.23
Summarizing, we have shown for this example, with ￿ < ￿ ￿ and c = 0, there is an
equilibrium such that, for all n, An searches and trades x to An+1 for yn = y￿. Appealing
to continuity, similar results hold with c > 0, as long as c is not too big. In this equilibrium
23Without the assumption c = 0, one can show search is viable i⁄ Q(￿) ￿ 0, where Q(￿) is the quadratic
Q(￿) = ￿￿2[r2 + 2r￿ + ￿2￿] + ￿[￿2￿ ￿ 2(r + ￿)c] ￿ c2:
Hence, 9￿ c > 0 such that c < ￿ c implies search is viable for ￿ 2 [￿1;￿2], with 0 < ￿1 < ￿2; and for c > ￿ c search
is not viable for any ￿ ￿ 0. As c ! 0, [￿1;￿2] ! [0; ￿ ￿] consistent with (27).
27no one ever consumes x ￿it is an asset that circulates forever as a medium of exchange. For
search to be viable we require [￿U(y￿) ￿ c]=(r + ￿) ￿ ￿, and a fortiori y￿ > y￿. This says
that the amount of y required to acquire x is above the fundamental value, y￿ > y￿. This is
a genuine bubble. This may be surprising to some, although maybe not to those well versed
in monetary theory, where it is understood that objects can be valued for their liquidity over
and above their value as consumption goods, the way, say, cigarettes were valued in historical
examples where they served not only consumption goods but also media of exchange and
stores of value.24
So far we have constructed an equilibrium with a stationary bubble, yn = y￿ > y￿ for
all n. Can we have nonstationary bubbles? When ￿(0) > 0, it is clear from Figure 7 that
the answer is no. With ￿(0) > 0, all paths except yn = y￿ for all n either lead to yn < 0,
or explode so that eventually yn > ￿ y. But suppose ￿(0) < 0, as shown in Figure 8, which
occurs when c > y￿ (r + ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)=￿. As long as c is not too big, there are multiple steady
states, y￿
1 and y￿
2. As in the Figure, suppose ￿[U(y￿
1) ￿ c]=(r + ￿) > ￿, so that near y￿
1,
search is viable. Then, as the Figure shows, there are nonconstant paths for yn satisfying all
the equilibrium conditions, even though fundamentals are time invariant. From the left, yn
rises over time, in progressively smaller increments, until settling at y￿
1; and from the right,
yn falls in progressively smaller increments, again settling at y￿
1. In either case, whether we
would say the price is rising or falling depends on whether we takes x or y to be money.
In any case, we have nonstationary bubbles. Some of these equilibria might look funny
because agents are ￿buying high and selling low￿ ￿for instance, starting to the right of
y￿
1, agent An+1 gives up yn to get x, and later receives only yn+1 < yn in return. This is
24A classic reference is Radford￿ s (1945, 190-191) description of a POW camp: ￿Between individuals there
was active trading in all consumer goods and in some services. Most trading was for food against cigarettes
or other food stu⁄s, but cigarettes rose from the status of a normal commodity to that of currency. ... With
this development everyone, including nonsmokers, was willing to sell for cigarettes, using them to buy at
another time and place. Cigarettes became the normal currency.￿Similarly, Friedman (1992, 12-12) reports:
￿After World War II [in Germany] the Allied occupational authorities exercised su¢ ciently rigid control
over monetary matters, in the course of trying to enforce price and wage controls, that it was di¢ cult to
use foreign currency. Nonetheless, the pressure for a substitute currency was so great that cigarettes and
cognac emerged as substitute currencies and attained an economic value far in excess of their value purely as
goods to be consumed. ... Foreigners often expressed surprise that Germans were so addicted to American
cigarettes that they would pay a fantastic price for them. The usual reply was ￿ Those aren￿ t for smoking;















Figure 8: U(y) nonlinear and c > 0
ostensibly a funny strategy for a middleman, even without accounting for his time and search
costs. Yet it is obviously an equilibrium strategy because, although he gives up yn and only
receives yn+1 < yn, the payo⁄ from yn+1 is U(yn+1) > yn. Indeed, even the ex ante payo⁄
when x is acquired, taking into account time and search costs, exceeds the cost of acquiring
it, or he wouldn￿ t do it. For this we need nonlinear utility.
To close this part of the discussion we want to say more about bargaining. First. it is not
necessary to use our particular extensive form to generate interesting dynamics. Suppose
one instead uses generalized Nash:
yn = argmax
y [U (y) ￿ ￿]
￿ ￿
V n+1 ￿ y
￿1￿￿
The FOC is ￿
￿
V n+1 ￿ yn
￿
U0(y) = (1￿￿)[U (yn)￿￿], which has a unique solution that does




. Inserting V n+1 we get a dynamical
system analogues to (26):






This has qualitatively similar properties to the system yn = ￿(yn+1) derived from our game.
The same is true for Kalai￿ s proportional solution, which satis￿es
￿
￿
V n+1 ￿ y
￿
= (1 ￿ ￿)[U (y) ￿ ￿];




and yn = ~ ￿(yn+1).
The three bargaining solutions imply di⁄erent values of yn but all generate dynamical
systems that behave similarly, and all can generate multiple stationary equilibria as well as
paths where yn varies with n. We like our game because it has explicit strategic founda-
tions.25 This is often said to also be a desirable property of Nash bargaining: write down
a standard strategic model with randomly alternating countero⁄ers, take the limit as the
time between countero⁄ers goes to 0, and out pops the Nash solution, at least in stationary
bargaining situations (Binmore 1987; Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky 1986). As demon-
strated in Coles and Wright (1998) and Coles and Muthoo (2003), however, this breaks
down in nonstationary situations unless one makes additional assumptions, like imposing
linear utility or giving one agent all the bargaining power. In general, in a nonstationary
bargaining situation, when one writes down the same strategic model, and takes the limit,
one gets a di⁄erential equation for the terms of trade that equals Nash in steady state but
not out of steady state, unless we make special assumptions like (in our notation) U(y) = y
or ￿ = 1.
Further, the above-mentioned papers show that the set of dynamic equilibria can be
qualitatively di⁄erent when one uses the correct limit of the game rather than sticking in
the Nash solution out of steady state. Further still, the papers show that sticking the Nash
solution into the model out of steady state is equivalent to inserting the equilibrium outcome
of the alternating-o⁄er game under the assumption that agents have myopic expectations ￿
they believe continuation values will not change over time even though in equilibrium they
do change over time. To the extent that one wants strategic foundations for bargaining
, and wants to analyze dynamic models out of steady state, and wants to use nonlinear
utility, there are issues with Nash solution. Less is known about the strategic foundations
of proportional bargaining. Of course, we saw earlier that when utility is linear, our game
is equivalent to proportional or Nash bargaining. We now compare the three bargaining
25Nash himself argued that it was important to write down explicit environments where his bargaining
solution would arise as an equilibrium, an endeavor now referred to as the Nash program (e.g., Osborne and
Rubinstein 1990, chapter 4).
30solutions in steady state for the nonlinear U(y) =
p
y (because we are looking at steady
state, the Nash solution does follow as the limit of a strategic bargaining game, just not our
strategic bargaining game).
One can solve the example with our strategic bargaining solution, the Nash solution, and
the proportional solution. In Appendix B we show that for each case there are upper bounds
for ￿ that make search viable, and when c = 0 these are given by
￿s =
￿￿2
r2 + 2r￿ + ￿￿2
￿n =
￿￿2
r2(2 ￿ ￿) + 2r￿ + ￿￿2 (28)
￿p =
￿[￿￿ ￿ r(1 ￿ ￿)]
￿(r + ￿)
2 ;
where the subscripts s, n, and p signify strategic, Nash and proportional bargaining, and we
assume ￿￿ > r(1 ￿ ￿). We can show ￿n ￿ ￿s < 1 and ￿p < 1, but the relationship between
￿p and the other two is unclear. When ￿ = 1, all are equal to ￿ = ￿2=(r + ￿)2. If we let
















[2￿ ￿ 1 +
p
1 ￿ 4￿(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)]:
We can show y￿
n < y￿
s < 1, and y￿
n = y￿
s = 1 when ￿ = 1. The relationship with y￿
p is less
clear. The following graphs show y as a function of ￿ for two examples, with di⁄erent values
of ￿, illustrating how one cannot compare the solutions in general. We conclude that, with
nonlinear utility, even when we look at steady states, these di⁄erent bargaining solutions
generally give di⁄erent answers. Again, we like our solution because it has a simple strategic
foundation, in and out of steady state. We wanted to look at economies out of steady state
because we are interested in nonstationary bubbles, and we needed to look at nonlinear
utility because this is necessary to get such an outcome. However, if one cares less about
strategic foundations, one can use other bargaining solutions are get similar results. The
31model of intermediated trade, or, from a di⁄erent perspective, the model of an indivisible



























Model comparison when ￿ = 0:2
7 Conclusion
We conclude as we began, by saying that we are interested in trade that may be interme-
diated by middlemen. We showed how to get middlemen, and sometimes long chains of
middlemen, even in￿nite chains, with no end user in sight, that look like bubbles. This arose
naturally from our discussion of buyers versus sellers and goods versus money that itself arose
from our reading of the middleman and money literatures. There has been much progress
on these topics, much of it based on search theory and related techniques (the economics of
information), which is not surprising given money and middlemen are both institutions that
unquestionably exist to ameliorate frictions in the process of exchange. What is surprising
is that there is not much connection between the literatures, although there are a few pa-
pers that discuss some of the issues, including Li (1999). We think we have something to
contribute by highlighting the similarities and di⁄erences between existing models, and by
raising some new issues.
One new issue on which we focus is the phenomenon of intermediation chains, where A
32sells to B who sells to C and so on. A related issue concerns ￿ eshing out ideas about bargain-
ing with bargainers, leading to further insights on the ubiquity of holdup problems. We also
presented a comparison of various bargaining solutions. We think the strategic bargaining
solution on which we mainly focus is an attractive one for search models, especially those
with nonlinear utility and nonstationary equilibria, as in monetary theory. Many applica-
tions of these ideas are potentially interesting, including applications in ￿nancial markets,
and perhaps especially in real estate markets, where ￿ ipping is a prevalent activity. Addi-
tional research might also look into why producers often trade only with large or established
wholesalers, stymieing e⁄orts to disintermediate, or, to cut out the middleman. It would
also be interesting to try to understand further how buyers and sellers are di⁄erent and why
they are often treated so di⁄erently, as they are by the legal system. We leave all of this to
future research.
33Appendix A
Here we give the details behind the results in Section 3. Consider ￿rst type 2 equilibrium
with ￿1 = 1 and ￿ = 1. First, compute
V 21 ￿ V 20 =
￿2￿23y23 + ￿1￿21￿y12 ￿ ￿2c2
r + ￿2￿23 + ￿1￿21￿
: (30)
Using this, we get
y23 =
[r + ￿2￿23 + ￿1￿21￿(1 ￿ ￿12)]￿23￿3 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿23)￿2c2
r + ￿2￿23￿23 + ￿1￿21￿(1 ￿ ￿12)
y12 =
￿2￿12(￿23￿23￿3 ￿ c2)
r + ￿2￿23￿23 + ￿1￿21￿(1 ￿ ￿12)
;
and hence
V 21 ￿ V 20 =
￿2 (￿23￿23￿3 ￿ c2)
r + ￿2￿23￿23 + ￿1￿21￿(1 ￿ ￿12)
:
Thus, ￿ = 1 i⁄ ￿23￿23￿3 ￿ c2. Now substituting ￿21 = ￿1￿12=￿2, y13, y12 and m into (12)
and setting ￿1 = ￿ = 1, we see that ￿1 = 1 i⁄ (20) in the text holds.
Next consider type 1 equilibrium with ￿1 = 1 and ￿ = 0. First, we check that when
A1 and A2 meet, they do not trade. To determine this we have to determine what would
happen if they did trade. Consider the problem when A2 with x meets A3. The indi⁄erence





The we can back up to when A1 and A2 meet and solve for y12. Now consider the problem





Thus, ￿1 = 1 i⁄ V 1 ￿ 0 i⁄ ￿13￿13￿3 ￿ c1. Then ￿ = 0 i⁄ V 21 ￿ 0 is given by ￿23￿23￿3 ￿ c2.
Finally, consider type 0 equilibrium, ￿1 = 0. The ￿rst subcase is ￿ = 1, which holds i⁄
￿23￿23￿3 ￿ c2. Then ￿1 = 0 i⁄ the condition given in the text holds. The other subcase is
￿ = 0, which holds i⁄ ￿23￿23￿3 ￿ c2. Then ￿1 = 0 i⁄ ￿13￿13￿3 ￿ c1. This completes the
argument. ￿
34Appendix B
Here we give some more details concerning the example with U(y) =
p
y. First, we can
extend the case of our bargaining solution by relaxing the assumption c = 0 made in the
text. One can show search is viable i⁄ Q(￿) ￿ 0, where Q(￿) is the quadratic
Q(￿) = ￿￿
2[r
2 + 2r￿ + ￿
2￿] + ￿[￿
2￿ ￿ 2(r + ￿)c] ￿ c
2:
Hence, 9￿ c > 0 such that c < ￿ c implies search is viable for ￿ 2 [￿1;￿2], with 0 < ￿1 < ￿2; and
for c > ￿ c search is not viable for any ￿ ￿ 0. As c ! 0, [￿1;￿2] ! [0; ￿ ￿] consistent with (27).





Substituting V and rearranging terms, the steady state y solves
(2 ￿ ￿)(r + ￿)y ￿ [2￿(1 ￿ ￿)(r + ￿) + ￿￿]
p




[2￿(1 ￿ ￿)(r + ￿) + ￿￿] +
p
[2￿(1 ￿ ￿)(r + ￿) + ￿￿]2 ￿ 4(2 ￿ ￿)(r + ￿)c￿
2(2 ￿ ￿)(r + ￿)
Inserting U =
p




2(2 ￿ ￿) + 2r￿ + ￿
2￿] + ￿f[r(2 ￿ ￿) + ￿]2c ￿ ￿
2￿g + (2 ￿ ￿)c
2 ￿ 0:
Again there exists ￿ c > 0 such that c < ￿ c implies search is viable for ￿ 2 [￿1;￿2], with
0 < ￿1 < ￿2; and for c > ￿ c search is not viable for ￿ ￿ 0.
One can do the same for proportional bargaining. At steady state, we have
￿y +













￿[(1 ￿ ￿)r + ￿]=(r + ￿) +
s
[(1 ￿ ￿)r + ￿]2
(r + ￿)
2 ￿ 4￿[c￿=(r + ￿) ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)]
)
;
and the viability condition is
￿
2 (r + ￿)
2 ￿ + ￿f2￿c(r + ￿) + ￿[r(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿￿]g + c[￿c + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)] ￿ 0:
35Again, search is viable i⁄ c is small.
When c = 0, the upper bounds for ￿ that allow search are as given in (28). Algebra
implies ￿n ￿ ￿s < 1 and ￿p < 1, while the relationship between ￿p and the other two
is ambiguous. When c = 0 and r ! 0, all ￿n = ￿s = ￿p = 1 independent of ￿, and in
equilibrium U is given by (29). ￿
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